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Wednesday, May 7, 2014
Glass Reflections in Pictures + OSINT = More Accurate Location
By Alejandro Hern谩ndez - @nitr0usmx
Disclaimer: The
aim of this article is to help people to be more careful when taking
pictures through windows because they might reveal their location
inadvertently. The technique presented here might be used for many different purposes, such as to track down the location of the bad guys, to simply know in which hotel is that nice room or by some people, to follow the tracks of their favorite artist.
All of the pictures presented here were
posted by the owners on Twitter. The tools and information used to determine the
locations where the pictures were taken are all publically available on the
Internet. No illegal actions were performed in the work presented here. #160;
Introduction
Travelling can be enriching
and inspiring, especially if you #8217;re in a place you haven #8217;t been before. Whether
on vacation or travelling for business, one of the first things that people
usually do, including myself, after arriving in their hotel room, is turn on
the lights (even if daylight is still coming through the windows), jump on the
bed to feel how comfortable it is, walk to the window, and admire the view. If
you like what you see, sometimes you grab your camera and take a picture,
regardless of reflections in the window.
Read more #187;
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Wednesday, April 30, 2014
Hacking US (and UK, Australia, France, etc.) Traffic Control Systems
By Cesar Cerrudo @cesarcer
Hacking like in the movies
Probably many of you have watched scenes from quot;Live Free or Die Hard quot; (Die Hard 4) where quot;terrorist hackers quot; manipulate traffic signals by just hitting Enter or typing a few keys. I wanted to do that! I started to look around, and while I couldn #39;t exactly do the same thing (too Hollywood style!), I got pretty close. I found some interesting devices used by traffic control systems in important US cities, and I could hack them :) These devices are also #160;
used in cities in the UK, France, Australia, China, etc., making them even more interesting.
After getting the devices, it wasn #39;t difficult to find vulnerabilities (actually, it was more #160;difficult #160;to make them work properly, but that #39;s another story).
Read more #187;
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at
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Wednesday, April 23, 2014
Hacking the Java Debug Wire Protocol - or - #8220;How I met your Java debugger #8221;
By Christophe Alladoum - @_hugsy_
TL;DR: turn any open JDWP service into reliable remote code execution (exploit inside)
lt;plagiarism gt; Kids, I #8217;m gonna tell you an incredible story. lt;/plagiarism gt;
This is the story of how I came across an interesting protocol during a recent engagement for IOActive and turned it into a reliable way to execute remote code. In this post, I will explain the Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP) and why it is interesting from a pentester #8217;s point of view. I will cover some JDWP internals and how to use them to perform code execution, resulting in a reliable and universal exploitation script. So let #8217;s get started.
Disclaimer: This post provides techniques and exploitation code that should not be used against vulnerable environments without prior authorization. The author cannot be held responsible for any private use of the tool or techniques described therein.
Note: As I was looking into JDWP, I stumbled upon two brief posts on the same topic (see [5] (in French) and [6]). They are worth reading, but do not expect that a deeper understanding of the protocol itself will allow you to reliably exploit it. This post does not reveal any 0-day exploits, but instead thoroughly covers JDWP from a pentester/attacker perspective. #160;
Read more #187;
Posted by
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Thursday, April 17, 2014
A Wake-up Call for SATCOM Security
By Ruben Santamarta @reversemode
During the last few months we have witnessed a series of events that will probably be seen as a tipping point in the public #8217;s opinion about the importance of, and need for, security. The revelations of Edward Snowden have served to confirm some theories and shed light on surveillance technologies that were long restricted.
We live in a world where an ever-increasing stream of digital data is flowing between continents. It is clear that those who control communications traffic have an upper-hand.
Satellite Communications (SATCOM) plays a vital role in the global telecommunications system. Sectors that commonly rely on satellite networks include:
Aerospace
Maritime
Military and governments
Emergency services
Industrial (oil rigs, gas, electricity)
Media
It is important to mention that certain international safety regulations for ships such as GMDSS or aircraft's ACARS rely on satellite communication links. In fact, we recently read how, thanks to the SATCOM equipment on board Malaysian Airlines MH370, Inmarsat engineers were able to determine the approximate position of where the plane crashed.
IOActive is committed to improving overall security. The only way to do so is to analyze the security posture of the entire supply chain, from the silicon level to the upper layers of software.
Thus, in the last quarter of 2013 I decided to research into a series of devices that, although widely deployed, had not received the attention they actually deserve. The goal was to provide an initial evaluation of the security posture of the most widely deployed Inmarsat and Iridium SATCOM terminals.
In previous blog posts I've explained the common approach when researching complex devices that are not physically accessible. In these terms, this research is not much different than the previous research: in most cases the analysis was performed by reverse engineering the firmware statically.
What about the results?
Insecure and undocumented protocols, backdoors, hard-coded credentials...mainly design flaws that allow remote attackers to fully compromise the affected devices using multiple attack vectors.
Ships, aircraft, military personnel, emergency services, media services, and industrial facilities (oil rigs, gas pipelines, water treatment plants, wind turbines, substations, etc.) could all be affected by these vulnerabilities.
I hope this research is seen as a wake-up call for both the vendors and users of the current generation of SATCOM technology. We will be releasing full technical details in several months, at Las Vegas, so stay tuned.
The following white paper comprehensively explains all the aspects of this research http://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_SATCOM_Security_WhitePaper.pdf
Posted by
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at
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Thursday, April 10, 2014
Bleeding Hearts
By Robert Erbes @rr_dot
The Internet is ablaze with talk of the "heartbleed" OpenSSL vulnerability disclosed yesterday (April 7, 2014) here: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140407.txt
While the bug itself is a simple #8220;missing bounds check, #8221; it affects quite a number of high-volume, big business websites (https://github.com/musalbas/heartbleed-masstest/blob/master/top1000.txt).
Make no mistake, this bug is BAD. It's sort of a perfect storm: the bug is in a library used to encrypt sensitive data (OpenSSL), and it allows attackers a peak into a server's memory, potentially revealing that same sensitive data in the clear.
Initially, it was reported that private keys could be disclosed via this bug, basically allowing attackers to decrypt captured SSL sessions. But as more people start looking at different sites, other issues have been revealed #8211; servers are leaking information ranging from user sessions (https://www.mattslifebytes.com/?p=533) to encrypted search queries (duckduckgo) and passwords (https://twitter.com/markloman/status/453502888447586304). The type of information accessible to an attacker is entirely a function of what happens to be in the target server #8217;s memory at the time the attacker sends the request.
While there's lot of talk about the bug and its consequences, I haven't seen much about what actually causes the bug. Given that the bug itself is pretty easy to understand (and even spot!), I thought it would be worthwhile to walk through the vulnerability here for those of you who are curious about the why, and not just the how-to-fix.
The Bug
The vulnerable code is found in OpenSSL's TLS Heartbeat Message handling routine - hence the clever "heartbleed" nickname. The TLS Heartbeat protocol is defined in RFC 6520 - "Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension".
Before we get into the OpenSSL code, we should examine what this protocol looks like.
The structure of the Heartbeat message is very simple, consisting of a 8-bit message type, a 16-bit payload length field, the payload itself, and finally a sequence of padding bytes. In pseudo-code, the message definition looks like this (copied from the RFC):
The type (line 2) is simply 1 or 2, depending on whether the message is a request or a response.
The payload_length (line 3) indicates the size of the payload part of the message, which follows immediately. Being a 16-bit unsigned integer, its maximum value is 2^16-1 (which is 65535). If you've done some other reading about this bug, you'll recognize the 64k as being the upper limit on how much data can be accessed by an attacker per attack sent.
The payload (line 4) is defined to be "arbitrary content" of length payload_length.
And padding (line 5) is "random content" at least 16 bytes long, and "MUST be ignored."
Easy enough!
Now I think it should be noted here that the RFC itself appears sound - it describes appropriate behavior for what an implementation of the protocol should and shouldn't do. In fact, the RFC explicitly states that "If the payload_length of a received HeartbeatMessage is too large, the received HeartbeatMessage MUST be discarded silently." Granted, "too large" isn't defined, but I digress #8230;
There is one last part of the RFC that's important for understanding this bug: The RFC states that "When a HeartbeatRequest message is received ... the receiver MUST send a corresponding HeartbeatResponse message carrying an exact copy of the payload of the received HeartbeatRequest." This is important in understanding WHY vulnerable versions of OpenSSL are sending out seemingly arbitrary blocks of memory.
Now, on to OpenSSL code!
Here's a snippet from the DTLS Heartbeat handling function in (the vulnerable) openssl-1.0.1f\ssl\d1_both.c:
If you're not familiar with reading C, this can be a lot to digest. The bug will become clearer if we go through this function piece by piece. We #8217;ll start at the top #8230;
This part just defines local variables for the function. The most important one here is the char pointer p (line 1457), which points to the heartbeat message the attacker controls. hbtype (line 1458)will hold the HeartbeatMessageType value mentioned in the RFC, and payload (line 1459)will hold the payload_length value. Don't let the fact that the payload_length value is being stored in the payload variable confuse you!
Here, the first byte of the message is copied into the hbtype variable (line 1463), and the 16-bit payload-length is copied from p (the attacker-controlled message) to the payload variable using the n2s function (line 1464). The n2s function simply converts the value from the sequence of bits in the message to a number the program can use in calculations. Finally, the pl pointer is set to point to the payload section of the attacker-controlled message (line 1465).
On line 1474, a variable called buffer is defined and then allocated (line 1481) an area of memory using the attacker-controlled payload variable to calculate how much memory should be allocated. Then, on line 1482, the bp pointer is set to point to the buffer that was just allocated for the server's response.
As an aside, if the payload_length field which gets stored in the payload variable were greater than 16-bits (say, 32 or 64-bits instead), we'd be looking at another couple of vulnerabilities: either an integer overflow leading to a buffer overflow, or potentially a null-pointer dereference. The exact nature and exploitability of either of these would depend upon the platform itself, and the exact implementation of OPENSSL_malloc. Payload_length *is* only 16-bits however, so we'll continue...
This code snippet shows the server building the response. It's here that this bug changes from being an attacker-controlled length field leading to Not Very Much into a serious information disclosure bug causing a big stir. Line 1485 simply sets the type of the response message pointed to by bp to be a Heartbeat Response. According to the RFC, the payload_length should be next, and indeed - it is being copied over to the bp response buffer via the s2n function on line 1486. The server is just copying the value the attacker supplied, which was stored in the payload variable. Finally, the payload section of the attacker message (pointed to by pl, on line 1465) is copied over to the response buffer, pointed to by the bp variable (again, according to the RFC specification), which is then sent back to the attacker.
And herein lies the vulnerability - the attacker-controlled payload variable (which stores the payload_length field!) is used to determine exactly how many bytes of memory should be copied into the response buffer, WITHOUT first being checked to ensure that the payload_length supplied by the attacker is not bigger than the size of the attacker-supplied payload itself.
This means that if an attacker sends a payload_length greater than the size of the payload, any data located in the server #8217;s memory after the attacker #8217;s payload would be copied into the response. If the attacker set the payload_length to 10,000 bytes and only provided a payload of 10 bytes, then a little less than an extra 10,000 bytes of server memory would be copied over to the response buffer and sent back to the attacker. Any sensitive information that happened to be hanging around in the process (including private keys, unencrypted messages, etc.) is fair game. The only variable is what happens to be in memory. In playing with some of the published PoCs against my own little test server (openssl s_server FTW), I got a whole lot of nothing back, in spite of targeting a vulnerable version, because the process wasn't doing anything other than accepting requests. To reiterate, the data accessed entirely depends on what's in memory at the time of the attack.
Testing it yourself
There are a number of PoCs put up yesterday and today that allow you to check your own servers. If you're comfortable using an external service, you can check out http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/. Or you can grab filippo #8217;s golang code from https://github.com/FiloSottile/Heartbleed, compile it yourself, and test on your own. If golang is not your cup of tea, I'd check out the simple Python version here: https://gist.github.com/takeshixx/10107280. All that's required is a Python2 installation.
Happy Hunting!
Posted by
Cesar
at
7:40 AM
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Tuesday, April 8, 2014
Car Hacking 2: The Content
By Chris Valasek @nudehaberdasher
Does everyone remember when those two handsome young gentlemen controlled automobiles with CAN message injection (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oqe6S6m73Zw)? I sure do. However, what if you don #8217;t have the resources to purchase a car, pay for insurance, repairs to the car, and so on?
Fear not Internet!
Chris and Charlie to the rescue. Last week we presented our new automotive research at Syscan 2014 (http://www.syscan.org/index.php/download). To make a long story short, we provided the blueprints to setup a small automotive network outside the vehicle so security researchers could start investigating Autosec (TM pending) without requiring the large budget needed to procure a real automobile. (Update: Andy Greenberg just released an article explaining our work, http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2014/04/08/darpa-funded-researchers-help-you-learn-to-hack-a-car-for-a-tenth-the-price/)
Additionally, we provided a solution for a mobile testing platform (a go-cart) that can be fashioned with ECUs from a vehicle (or purchased on Ebay) for testing that requires locomotion, such as assisted braking and lane departure systems.
For those of you that want the gritty technical details, download this paper. As always, we #8217;d love feedback and welcome any questions.
The paper: http://illmatics.com/car_hacking_poories.pdf
Posted by
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at
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Wednesday, March 26, 2014
A Bigger Stick To Reduce Data Breaches
By Gunter Ollmann, @gollmann
On average I receive a postal letter from a bank or retailer every two months telling me that I've become the unfortunate victim of a data theft or that my credit card is being re-issued to prevent against future fraud. When I quiz my friends and colleagues on the topic, it would seem that they too suffer the same fate on a reoccurring schedule. It may not be that surprising to some folks. 2013 saw over 822 million private records exposed according to the folks over at DatalossDB - and that's just the ones that were disclosed publicly.
It's clear to me that something is broken and it's only getting worse. When it comes to the collection of personal data, too many organizations have a finger in the pie and are ill equipped (or prepared) to protect it. In fact I'd question why they're collecting it in the first place. All too often these organizations - of which I'm supposedly a customer - are collecting personal data about "my experience" doing business with them and are hoping to figure out how to use it to their profit (effectively turning me in to a product). If these corporations were some bloke visiting a psychologist, they'd be diagnosed with a hoarding disorder. For example, consider what criteria the DSM-5 diagnostic manual uses to identify the disorder:
Persistent difficulty discarding or parting with possessions, regardless of the value others may attribute to these possessions.
This difficulty is due to strong urges to save items and/or distress associated with discarding.
The symptoms result in the accumulation of a large number of possessions that fill up and clutter active living areas of the home or workplace to the extent that their intended use is no longer possible.
The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
The hoarding symptoms are not due to a general medical condition.
The hoarding symptoms are not restricted to the symptoms of another mental disorder.
Whether or not the organizations hording personal data know how to profit from it or not, it's clear that even the biggest of them are increasingly inept at protecting it. The criminals that are pilfering the data certainly know what they're doing. The gray market for identity laundering has expanded phenomenonly since I talked about at Blackhat in 2010.
We can moan all we like about the state of the situation now, but we'll be crying in the not too distant future when statistically we progress from being a victim to data loss, to being a victim of (unrecoverable) fraud.
The way I see it, there are two core components to dealing with the spiraling problem of data breaches and the disclosure of personal information. We must deal with the "what data are you collecting and why?" questions, and incentivize corporations to take much more care protecting the personal data they've been entrusted with.
I feel that the data hording problem can be dealt with fairly easily. At the end of the day it's about transparency and the ability to "opt out". If I was to choose a role model for making a sizable fraction of this threat go away, I'd look to the basic component of the UK's Data Protection Act as being the cornerstone of a solution - especially here in the US. I believe the key components of personal data collection should encompass the following:
Any organization that wants to collect personal data must have a clearly identified "Data Protection Officer" who not only is a member of the executive board, but is personally responsible for any legal consequences of personal data abuse or data breaches.
Before data can be collected, the details of the data sought for collection, how that data is to be used, how long it would be retained, and who it is going to be used by, must be submitted for review to a government or legal authority. I.e. some third-party entity capable of saying this is acceptable use - a bit like the ethics boards used for medical research etc.
The specifics of what data a corporation collects and what they use that data for must be publicly visible. Something similar to the nutrition labels found on packaged foods would likely be appropriate - so the end consumer can rapidly discern how their private data is being used.
Any data being acquired must include a date of when it will be automatically deleted and removed.
At any time any person can request a copy of any and all personal data held by a company about themselves.
At any time any person can request the immediate deletion and removal of all data held by a company about themselves.
If such governance existed for the collection and use of personal data, then the remaining big item is enforcement. You'd hope that the morality and ethics of corporations would be enough to ensure they protected the data entrusted to them with the vigor necessary to fight off the vast majority of hackers and organized crime, but this is the real world. Apparently the "big stick" approach needs to be reinforced.
A few months ago I delved in to how the fines being levied against organizations that had been remiss in doing all they could to protect their customer's personal data should be bigger and divvied up. Essentially I'd argue that half of the fine should be pumped back in to the breached organization and used for increasing their security posture.
Looking at the fines being imposed upon the larger organizations (that could have easily invested more in protecting their customers data prior to their breaches), the amounts are laughable. No noticeable financial pain occurs, so why should we be surprised if (and when) it happens again. I've become a firm believer that the fines businesses incur should be based upon a percentage of valuation. Why should a twenty-billion-dollar business face the same fine for losing 200,000,000 personal records as a ten-million-dollar business does for losing 50,000 personal records? If the fine was something like two-percent of valuation, I can tell you that the leadership of both companies would focus more firmly on the task of keeping yours and mine data much safer than they do today.
Posted by
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at
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